One quick clarification when I refer to P3s as a ‘second-best’ solution to revenue volatility in various places – I don’t mean they should be considered a ‘less-bad gimmick’ than real outside-fiscal-constraints culprits like deferred maintenance and underfunding pensions.

Those gimmicks are bad because they’re expensive and opaque. P3s can and should be consciously structured to be cost-efficient, transparent and discipline-enforcing, even if part of their purpose is to provide some down-cycle relief to fiscal constraints. Explicitly measuring P3 value in that way also highlights why first-best solutions for revenue volatility (e.g. bigger rainy-day funds, more stable mix of revenues etc.) should be the ultimate goal, especially if the real cost of the current set of gimmicks is further exposed in the process.

So I think P3s done primarily for fiscal constraint relief can be put on the good-guy side of public policy if (and maybe only if) they’re done correctly.  Since you can’t really hide something as big and obvious — and usually controversial — as a P3, I think a lot of people will be making sure that happens.  Contrast that to just sweeping deferred maintenance under the fraying rug.